

Trade
in Amer.
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AN
IMPARTIAL VIEW
OF THE
CONDUCT of the M-----RY,
IN REGARD TO
The WAR in *AMERICA*;
THE
ENGAGEMENTS Entered into
WITH
Russia, Hesse-Cassel, and Prussia;
THE
CAUSE of THROWING OUT
THE
MILITIA BILL,
AND,
The AFFAIRS of the MEDITERRANEAN.
In ANSWER to the many
INVIDUOUS ATTACKS
OF
PAMPHLETEERS, &c.

*Jurgia discordias, simulates cum hostibus exerce-
bant: Civis cum civibus de Vertute pugnabant.*

SALLUST.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year 1756.

AN
HISTORICAL VIEW

OF THE
CONDUCT OF THE MARY

IN REGARD TO
THE WAR IN AMERICA

THE
CABINET'S PROCEEDINGS

IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS

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AN
IMPARTIAL VIEW
OF

The CONDUCT of the M——RY, &c.

IN the Course of an Enquiry into
the Conduct of the M——y, it will
be necessary to examine particularly two Points ;—The First is, whether or no they have acted upon Principles of true Patriotism and sound Policy, and in case any Miscarriages may have happen'd, whether they are not to be attributed more to Chance, and the Want of that unattainable Fore-knowledge, not in the Power of Man to acquire, than any Defect in the M——rs Capacities? Or, whether seditious Spirits, who may have propagated infamous Reports to the M——rs Prejudice, are to be credited upon their simple Evidence, in Opposition to

Facts, Reason and their concomitant Arguments.

To answer any particular anti-ministerial Snarlers, is not my Intent here, for as all their Arguments seem to be built at present upon the same Basis, by saying that, the Fabric of their Calumnies must fall.

WHEN they attack the Measures of the M——ry, after the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, in nominating Commissaries to settle the Limits of our Possessions, and those of *France*, in *America*, and, as they pretend, by that means giving an Opportunity to the *French*, under the Mask of Negotiation, to seize upon our Possessions on the *Ohio*; they should consider, by the Nature of a general Peace, as that of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, wherein the Interests of so many Princes were concerned, it would have been morally impossible to have therein ever discussed the Subject of the Conferences of the Commissaries at *Paris*; besides, in case such a Negotiation, had been commenced, if we may (and surely we may) judge by the
the

the Length of Time which the Commis-
saries were at *Paris*, and where they still
left the Limits undecided, that the Con-
ferences at *Aix-la-Chapelle*, must have
lasted till the Middle of the Year 1755;
which (not to mention the Expence that
would have attended the Necessity of
keeping an equal Number of Troops in
Pay, and as formidable a Navy as during
the last War, since it would not yet have
been terminated) would certainly have in-
duced the different Powers of *Europe* to
accede to the Treaty of *Aix*, without
waiting for the Discussion of our Limits in
the new World ; and the Treaty or Trea-
ties they could conjointly or separately
have concluded with *France*, not having
Weight in the Ballance, must inevitably
have proved much more to our Disad-
vantage, than even the Negotiations we
continued at *Paris* till the Year 1755.

How then could we have avoided any
of the Consequences which have resulted
from the Treaty of *Aix* ? for although we
were not unacquainted with the Chicane-
ry of *French* Ministers in Negotiations, we
could

could not imagine that in a time of profound Peace, they would, for their own Honour, dare attack what they allowed by the Negotiation, neither had yet a determined Right to ; but as soon as we perceived they cared not for Appearances, but under the Veil of a Conference, used open Force to gain what their Ministers were negotiating about, we did not hesitate what Course we had to steer, we repulsed Force by Force ; and tho' nothing memorable has been mentioned in the public Papers concerning the Opposition we made to the *French* Encroachments, before the Action of Major *Washington* in 1754, we well know that several Skirmishes happened before that time, as well upon the *Ohio* as in *Nova Scotia*.

OUR Conduct in *America* since that Epocha, has been far from blameable. Upon Advice being received, in the Beginning of the Year 1755, that the *French* were preparing a Fleet to be sent to *North America*, with Troops on board, under the Command of Mr. *Dubois de la Mothe*, Mr. *Boscawen* was sent with a numerous Fleet

Fleet in quest of the *French*, and to attack them, in case they endeavour'd landing their Forces in *America*. Here the unthinking, uninform'd Censurer *, takes Occasion to let us know, that the *French* Fleet was superior to the *English* that fail'd from here, and that if Mr. *Macnamara's* Return to *Brest*, had not diminished it, we should certainly have been vanquished before Mr. *Holbourne's* Arrival in the *American* Seas to reinforce the Squadron under Admiral *Boscawen*; and this Step he attributes to the *Ignorance* of the M——r. But this he would not have asserted, could he but have reflected, that a more certain Intelligence than ever he could have come at, might very well have informed the M——r, “ That though the *French* “ Squadron was superior to the *English*, “ having no Orders to attack Mr. *Boscawen's* Fleet, and Mr. *Macnamara's* “ Division of it being destin'd to sail only “ to a certain Latitude, and then return “ to *Brest*, a superior *English* † Fleet would

* See the first and fourth Letters to the People of *England*.

† The Fleet which was sent under the Com-

“ would be unnecessary in the *European*
 “ Seas; and as this Fleet, when arrived
 “ at *America*, would be reinforced by
 “ several Ships there already stationed, it
 “ would be next to impossible for the
 “ *English* Fleet to miss intercepting the
 “ *French* in their Passage to St. *Lawrence’s*
 “ River.” So that if any Comment can be
 made upon the Conduct of the M——r,
 or Super-intendant of public Affairs, in
 this Respect, it must be to applaud the
 Parsimony with which they applied the
 public Money, where the unnecessary Ex-
 pence of equipping a larger Fleet at first
 with such great Diligence, could not have
 been attended with more Success than the
 taking

Command of Admirals *Boscawen* and *Mosby*,
 was composed of no less than Twelve Men of
 War of the Line, besides Frigates: And that
 truly experienced Sailor, who so worthily pre-
 sides at the Head of our Naval Affairs, being
 apprehensive that Accident of some sort or
 other might reduce the Force of this formida-
 ble Fleet before it arrived in the *American*
 Seas, judiciously caused a second Fleet to be
 equipped with surprising Diligence, and which
 sailed under the Command of Admiral *Hol-*
bourne. This second Fleet consisted of Six
 Men of War of the Line, besides Frigates.

taking the *Alcide* and *Lys*, two fine *French* Ships, now riding in our Harbours.

THE Reason why we did not attack the *French* Fleet coming out of *Brest*, or in *Europe*, is evident : The justest of Kings, who only intended striking Blow for Blow, and to prevent his own Property from being invaded, was too sensible of the Use the *French* might have made of such an Attack in the *European* Seas, which might perhaps have induced the *European* Powers to have decided the Justice of the Cause against us. Besides at that time, although we contended about the Limits of our *American* Possessions, neither our Minister at *Paris*, nor the *French* Ambassador here, was yet recalled; so that many sanguine Hopes were still entertained, that the Differences might be amicably adjusted. The Misfortune, which attended General *Braddock's* Rashness, cannot in any Shape be attributed to the M——ry; for if they judged, as they did, by his Behaviour in the last War in *Europe*, no other Opinion could be formed of him, than that of a valiant,

experienced Officer. But the Misfortune was, those Talents, which would have signalized him in *Europe*, were his Destruction in *America*. The M——y could not foresee, that out of a false Notion of Honour, he would not use the *Indian* manner of Fighting. However, to prevent any such second Cause of ill Success, they nominated Mr. *Shirley*, who had been Governor of *Massachusetts-Bay* for several Years; and who, consequently, was not only acquainted with the Manner, but also with the Advantages of the *Indian* way of Fighting in that Country, as well as many other Requisites, that a Stranger could not be informed of: Yet the Antiministerial Libellers take Occasion to blame this second Nomination, “ because Mr. “ *Shirley* was bred a Lawyer, and was “ one of the Commissaries at *Paris* for “ settling the Limits of *America*.” What absurd Cause of Complaint! since these very Circumstances in Mr. *Shirley*’s Character, if they could be supposed of any Weight, must rather have qualified than disqualified him for a Commander in Chief; for a good Lawyer is not incompatible

patible with a good Soldier, but on the contrary, as Martial-Law is in many Cases connected with Civil Law, it may be requisite for such a Commander to be informed of both: And his Acquaintance with the Chicanery of the *French* Court, by means of his assisting at settling the Limits, must not only have pointed out to him the Schemes of the *French* upon *America*, but also the most probable Means of circumventing them.

BUT if we lament *Braddock's* Defeat, let us rejoice at *Johnson's* Victory at *Lake George*, where he routed *Two Thousand Three Hundred FRENCH*, and took their Commander in Chief, Baron *Dieskau*, Prisoner, after having slew a Thousand *French* and more. Though many assert that this Action was not equal to the Loss of *Braddock*; I am sure, if we add to it the taking of the Forts *Beau-sejour* and *Bay-Verte* (the first of which had *Twenty-six Pieces of Cannon*) where *an Hundred and Fifty* Regulars, and *Three Hundred* Inhabitants were taken Prisoners, besides the Killed and Wounded, no unprejudiced

Person will pretend to dispute that we gained what Advantage was gained upon the Continent of *America* last Year.—As to the Naval Operations there, every one knows that the *French* made no Reprisals for their Two Men of War we took.

THE many useful Dispositions plan'd by Mr. *Shirley* for the Protection of the *Frontier Settlements*, are sufficient to confute any Attacks upon his Conduct. He put *Oswego* in a State of Defence, and caused four large Vessels to be constructed and equipped for the Protection of the *English* Navigation upon *Lake Ontario* and occasionally annoy the *French*; and I doubt not but we shall soon hear of some important Blow in that Quarter, he having also plan'd the taking *Fort Frontenac* by means of these armed Vessels, which would in a great measure cut off the Communication of the *French* from *Quebec* across the Lakes to the *Mississipi*, that being the only Fort the *French* have on that Side *Lake Ontario*.

I HAVE gone through the most important Operations of last Year's Campaign in *America*, and cannot find in one single Instance any reasonable Charge against the M——ry. The Conferences, which were held the Beginning of this Year, have produced several Treaties made by Gen. *Johnson* (that great Warrior and truly estimable Patriot) with the *Mohawks*, *Seneca's*, *Oneidas*, *Onandagos*, and other *Indian Nations*, and in the Country of the last of these Nations the General has promised to build a Fort for the Security of their Castle, Wives and Children, while they are at War. These Treaties, made with no less than *Fourteen* of the *Indian Nations*, may be looked upon as a great Acquisition to the *English* Interest in *North America*, which together with the Pacification of the *Delawar Indians* (whose Barbarities and Insults, during the last Winter, upon Frontiers of *Pensylvania* and *Virginia*, loudly called for Redress) by the Interposition of the Authority of the Six Nations, is to be attributed only to the great
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Knowledge General *Jornson* has of *Indian Affairs*, and that vast Love all those Nations bear him, the *Mohawk Indians* having adopted him one of their Nation, and call him for Distinction Brother *War-raghiyage*.

THERE has been a great Stress laid upon the sojourning of Lord *Loudon* here, after he was named Commander in Chief of the Troops in *America*, as if there were an absolute Necessity for our losing this Campaign by his Absence from *America*; but when we consider, that while he waited here he was advancing to the utmost of his Power the *American Service*, by being a Spectator of the Embarkation of the Stores and Ammunition necessary not only for this Campaign, but for the Service of the Troops during the Winter, as well as next Spring (and perhaps longer) and that as soon as ever he had settled every Thing which a General should, who goes to gather Laurels in so distant a Country, he did not a Moment delay his Departure, and that, in the Interim, there was nothing left unattended to

to

to in *America*,—In a Word (according to the latest Accounts which may be relied upon) General *Johnson* was at the Head of *Nine Thousand* brave Troops in his Way to *Crown Point*; what Reason can there be for murmuring, and saying, our *American* Colonies have been left destitute?

How far the M——ry have been culpable in concluding the *Russian*, *Hessian* and *Prussian* Treaties, deserves our particular Attention, as the Railers at public Measures have made that a Pretext for condemning our Conduct in *Europe*.

DOUBTLESS the Cause of the present War between *England* and *France* was occasioned by the opposite Claims of both Parties in *America*, and as *England* and *France* only could be interested therein, it must be allowed by every one, who is not so troubled with a *Political-Antiministerial-Phrenzy*, as to be blinded to the most self-evident Facts, that the Part the King of G—— B—— took in the Quarrel, should not, in justice, affect his *German* Possessions, in Quality of El——r of H——r; and
yet

yet as *France* would doubtless annoy us either directly or indirectly, wherever Occasion would offer, it was necessary, before we resented in *Europe* the *French American* Encroachments, to secure the Electorate of *H——r*, and its Appendages, from any Attack of the *French*; and as the War which was expected to ensue, being occasioned, as I said before, by our different Claims in *America*, we could not reasonably expect that *Russia*, *Hesse-Cassel*, or any other Power upon the Continent, who could be of real Assistance to *H——r*, would engage in the Quarrel, or even keep disengaged from the *French*, if she had no other Interest than merely preventing *France* from acquiring too great Dominion. Besides this, it was to be apprehended that *France* would every way molest us, and as a Diversion upon this Island is that which must ever the most wound it, it was prudent to secure *Great-Britain* by Auxiliaries. as we had not a Militia on Foot to oppose their Designs, and as a full Southerly Wind, and a dark Night, might so favour an Expedition of that Sort, that all the Ships upon our Coasts and in
our

our Harbours could not prevent a Defcent.—In these Circumstances what could argue more sound Policy than the Conclusion of the *Prussian* and *Hessian* Treaties; the first of these Treaties stipulating (Article 2.) “ With this View her Imperial Majesty of all the *Russias* has not only
 “ caused to march towards the Frontiers
 “ of *Livonia* adjoining to *Lithuania*, but
 “ engages to hold there, as long as the
 “ Convention shall subsist, as near to those
 “ Frontiers as the Quarters will permit,
 “ a Body of her Troops, amounting to
 “ 55,000 Men; that is to say, 40,000
 “ Infantry of the Regular Troops, furnished with the necessary Artillery, and
 “ 15,000 Cavalry, composed of three
 “ Regiments of Cuirassiers, of twenty
 “ Companies of Horse Grenadiers, of two
 “ Regiments of Hussars, and the Remainder of Light Troops, to wit, of *Cossacks*
 “ and *Calmuks*, each with two Horses,
 “ as many as shall be wanting to compleat the 15,000 Cavalry; so that the
 “ whole Infantry and Cavalry shall form
 “ a compleat Body of 55,000 Men.”
 And (Article 3.) her Imperial Majesty
 C engages

engages to hold in readiness on the Coast of the abovementioned Province forty or fifty Gallies, with the necessary Crews, in Condition to act on the first Order. (Article 4.) " The Body of Troops and " the Gallies, mentioned in the two preceding Articles, shall not be put in " Activity but in case his *Britannic Majesty*, or any of his Allies should be attacked, and in that Case——shall " make as soon as possible a Diversion " with a Body of 30,000 Infantry, provided with the necessary Artillery, and " with all the 15,000 Cavalry abovementioned, and shall embark at the " same time the other 10,000 Infantry on " board the forty or fifty Gallies, in order " to make a Descent, according to the " Exigence of the Case, and the Utility of " the Service ;" and for these Services the *Empress* is to receive a Subsidy of 500,000*l.* *per Annum* while these Troops are in actual Service, and 100,000*l.* only while they are on the Frontiers of *Livonia*.

By the Treaty with the Elector of *Hesse-Cassel*, that Prince engages to hold in

in readiness during the Space of four Years, a Body of 8000 Men, composed of eight Battalions of Infantry of 800 Men, including the Officers, and three Regiments of Dragoons, or Cavalry, making in all 14,00 Horse, who are to be ready to march two Months, at farthest, after the Requisition of his *Britannic* Majesty, and this is performed for the Subsidy of 300,000 Crowns banco while the Troops are in March or actual Service, and during the Time the said Troops are not thus in Motion, though in the Pay of his *Britannic* Majesty, he is to pay 150,000 Crowns banco annually, besides 99,000 Crowns levy Money.

THUS the M——ry, by these sagacious Measures, had secured both *Great-Britain* and *Hanover* by engaging in her Service 63,000 Auxiliaries at the moderate annual Expence of 154,140*l.*—A Sum that would not have paid hardly 3000 *British* Soldiers, as is obvious by the Grant of the House of Commons last Year of 930,603*l.* 6*s.* 9*d.* for defraying the Charge of 34,263 effective Men, including 3759

Invalids employed in *Great-Britain* in the Year 1756; so that if we had raised the 63,000 more (engaged by this Treaty) in *England*, the Expence would have amounted to almost Three Millions, instead of 1084,743*l.* of which only 154,150*l.* are paid for the Sixty-three Thousand Auxiliaries; the other *Nine Hundred, Sixty Thousand, Six Hundred and Three Pounds*, being paid for the Support of 34,263 *English* Troops, among which there are 3759 Invalids.

MUST not every impartial Reader commend the OEconomy of the M——ry, who by this one Step have saved the Nation more than a Million and half; beside producing the Convention with the King of *Prussia*, which was certainly the Effect of the first of these Treaties, and cannot any wise be estimated, considering the fatal Consequences which must have accrued to this Nation from an Alliance between that Prince and the *French*, and which there was so much Reason to suppose would have taken Place before the Conclusion of the *Russian* Treaty, that,
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in a great measure, to ward off the Blow that such an Alliance would necessarily strike, was the Cause of this Engagement with the *Czarina*. If then upon the most cursory View of these Treaties such great Advantages can be perceived to result from them, what must be the Opinion of that nice Observer, who can descry, that by the Empress of *Russia*'s engaging in our Alliance, we have not only prevented any Motions of the *Turk* in Favour of the House of *Bourbon*, but have balanced the Weight of *Sweden* or *Denmark*, in case it should be thrown into the Scale against us; though, indeed, we need not have much Apprehension from the former, if we consider the general Confusion of *Sweden*, which seems steering directly towards a Commonwealth, if some unforeseen Blow of the King of *P——a* (who seems to be much stung at the Insult offered his Sister by the States of that Kingdom in appointing a Committee to inspect the Jewels of the Crown) does not reverse the Fate of that Country, and change it into an absolute Monarchy. However, the intestine Feuds, which must naturally attend such violent

violent Contortions, must too much affect the State, to be in a Capacity to assist the *French*, how much soever their Inclination may be that Way.

THE *Prussian* Treaty was certainly the legitimate Issue of the *Russian*; and altho' some would chuse to interpret them incompatible, we find that both may be easily executed. The *Prussian* Treaty, which has not yet been published, but whereof our Antiministerial Scribblers have formed several Conjectures, consists of five principal Articles, viz.

FIRST, The Indemnification of the *Prussian* Subjects for the Captures made by the *English* in the last War, which were their Property.

SECONDLY, The Payment of the Residue of the *Silesia* Loan, with all the Interest thereupon, due to the Subjects of *Great-Britain*.

THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, The Renewal of the Guaranty of *Silesia*, on the Part of his Britannic Majesty.

FOURTHLY, The Ceding of all Pretensions, which his Britannic Majesty formed, in Quality of Elector of *Hanover*, upon the Province of *East-Friseland*.

FIFTHLY, His *Prussian* Majesty's securing the Tranquility of the Empire, by preventing any Foreign Troops entering therein.

THE Two first Articles of this Treaty may be looked upon as the Preliminaries, and by which *England* gained no less than the Sum of 277,000*l.* Sterling; the Residue of the *Silesia* Loan amounting to the Sum of 150,000*l.* and the Interest thereupon unpaid for fourteen Years at the Rate of Seven *per Cent.* creating the Sum of 147,000*l.* which added together make 297,000*l.* and if we deduct from thence the Sum of 20,000*l.* paid by us to the *Prussian* Subjects, to indemnify them for the

the Loss of their Ships, &c. There still remains the Sum of 277,000*l.* (which we gained by settling these two Articles,) —A Sum sufficient to Pay the *Russian* and *Hessian* Subsidiary Treaties for two Years, which is half the Term we have engaged to support the Corps of Troops therein specified.

WHEN I come to the Fourth Article of the *Prussian* Treaty, it is with infinite Pleasure I find a general Confutation, to the many insolent and ungenerous Insinuations, “ That all his M——’s Views “ are confined to the aggrandizing of the “ El——te of *H——r*, and it’s Appen- “ dages.” Here we perceive he sacrifices his pretensions to a large District in *Germany*, and which the aulic Council of the Empire would most probably have decided in his favour, for the sake of engaging an Ally of such Consequence to *Great Britain* as the King of *Prussia*, and at the same Time obtaining for his British Subjects the Payment of a great Debt, which many had looked upon as irretrievably lost.

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THE Fifth Article, which some have chose to represent as a Contradiction of the Tenor of the *Russian* Treaty, if it can be construed into any Thing which may tend that way, will only prove that his M——y thought his *German* Territories sufficiently secured by the Assurance of his *Prussian* Majesty's keeping all Foreign, which must include the *French*, Troops out of the Empire ; as we certainly should have had the *Russian* Troops here for the Defence of this Island against the threaten'd Invasion of the *French*, if the Preparations made opposite our Coast had not indicated an earlier descent than, by the long March of the *Russians*, they could have prevented ; wherefore it was judiciously concluded to call over for the present the *Hessians*, and his Majesty's Electoral Troops in their stead.

Now let us Sum-up the Advantages and Disadvantages of these Treaties, and then impartially conclude on which Side lays the Ballance.

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Advan-

Advantages of the *Russian* Treaty.

THE Use of 55,000 Troops, for four Years, upon any Emergency. The Alliance of the Czarina, who might otherwise have been influenced to engage in the Interest of *France*. The Check she must naturally be upon the Queen of *Hungary* (now engaged in the Alliance of *France*) as well as upon all other Powers, particularly the Porte and those of the North, who may be inclined to make any Diversion in favour of *France*. And (not to repeat the Saving of Half a Million by this and the *Hessian* Treaty) the Production of the Treaty of *Westminster* with the King of *Prussia*, &c.

Advantages of the *Hessian* Treaty.

THE present important and necessary Use of securing these Kingdoms from an Invasion by the Assistance of 8000 Troops.

Disad-

Disadvantages of the *Russian* Treaty.

THE Expence of 100,000 *l.* a Year,
which, probably, may not be increased
during the Term of the Convention.

Disadvantages of the *Hessian* Treaty.

THE Payment of a Subsidy of
£. 54,140 12 *s.* 6 *d.*

Advantages of the *Prussian* Treaty.

FIRST, The Decision of the Differences which had subsisted for a long time between our Court and that of *Berlin*, particularly in Regard to the Detention of the Residue of the *Silesia* Loan on the one hand, and the *Prussian* Captures on the other. The settling the opposite Pretensions of his Majesty, in Quality of Elector of *Hanover*, and the King of *Prussia* to *East-Friseland*. The securing his *Prussian* Majesty in our Interest. The preventing the *French* entering into the Empire, which will probably save us Four Hundred Thousand Pounds *per Annum*, which we must have added to the *Russian* Subsidy, in case the Czarina's Troops had been put in Motion. And many others which the Reader, undoubtedly, may supply.

Disad-

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Disadvantages of the *Prussian Treaty*.

The

**The Amount of the Advantages in
Species.**

No impartial political Arithmetician can certainly estimate the Amount of the Advantages of the last Treaty to be equivalent to less than 8000,000 Sterling, which added to a Million and half gained by engaging Auxiliaries instead of *English* Troops, amount to 9,500,000 *l.* without estimating the other Advantages resulting from the *Prussian* Treaty,

The

The Amount of the }
Disadvantages in } £.154,140 12s. 6d.
Species.

But

But I know that many well-meaning Persons, who have not examined Things to their Depth, will here object to the *Russian* and *Hessian* Treaties, altho' they have produced these Advantages, " that " we should have done better without " them, if we had had our own Militia." To this general unproved Assertion, I shall make the following, I hope, reasonable Answer.

I AGREE that a *well-regulated* Militia, *thoroughly disciplined, and versed in the Use of Arms*, would tend more to the Advantage of *Great Britain*, than any Auxiliaries whatsoever: But at the same time I must take notice that a *Military Nation* can never be a *Commercial One*, and that a sufficient Application to become acquainted with the Use of Arms, so as to make them any wise serviceable to the Nation, must take up too much of every Militia-Man's Time to leave him a Sufficiency to follow his Calling. This has already been sufficiently treated upon in several Pieces published last Winter, and I think so greatly proved, that

that I shall not dwell upon it here, but on the contrary, make the only reasonable Objection that can be opposed to it, and which is, that 62680 *, (which is the Number of Militia proposed to be raised by the Bill brought in last Session) cannot any wise affect the general Weal, whether they are employed or not, so that they remain no Burthen upon the Parish; and supposing this a reasonable Answer, I shall reply, that if 62680 Men were the Sum total, of all that could be in any manner affected by the drawing off of the Mechanical Part of the People from their Work, by this Bill, the Answer would be compleat; but when we consider that, (according to the above-mentioned Bill) every Militia-Man would be obliged to act in that Capacity for three Years only, we may reasonably conclude, that in a Course of Years, the greatest Part of the Working and Labouring Men, (Artizans, Manufacturers and Husbandmen) in *England* would become Militia-Men, and consequently

* By the last Emendation of the Bill, the Number of the Militia to be raised was reduced to 62480.

frequently be prevented following their different Occupations during the Space of three Years ; and (it may perhaps be a new Observation in print, but a very common one in Life) when these Men should have neglected their Callings for three Years, they would, if they did at all, betake themselves to them again with great Unskillfulness ; so that if they should not be entirely undone as Artizans, they would at least require a much greater Number of Hands than before, to perform what they had done, and therefore proportionably our Manufactures must have diminish'd, and our Commerce decayed.

SUCH an Argument on the other Side of the Question, would be more than sufficient to fill *Four Letters to the People of England* *, but I shall dismiss it, without

* See the last (which is a Two Shilling Pamphlet) wherein we find but two Facts stated that are probable, and they, upon Enquiry, prove absolutely without Foundation,--- Namely, the Distribution of the Ammunition destined for *America* ;---and the Purchase of *Dutch Gun-powder*, that evaporated like Sawdust.

out drawing any other Consequence from it, and suppose there was not the least Objections of any kind to be made to a Militia Law, and that the Bill had been past last Session into one : Let me ask any reasonable impartial Person, how many Men does he think we should have had by this Time properly qualified to bear Arms in Defence of their King and Country, fit to face and oppose Veteran Troops, such as were sent under *Richelieu* to *Minnorca* ?

THE Bill regulated that they should be exercised every *Sunday*, after Divine Service, in the Church-yard ; and I think since the Parliament was adjourned is about ten Weeks ? so that, *allowing no Time for their Raising*, they could not have had more than *ten Lessons*.—What apt Scholars they must have been, to have learnt as much in ten Afternoon Lessons, as many of the Troops under *Richelieu* had been all their Life-time acquiring ! If so they would have been all now fit to take the Field upon the first Alarm, and without mistaking a single *Word of Command*,

mand, surpassed the *Hessians* in their Military Discipline—If not, the Answer must evidently be there would not have been one proper to oppose the Enemy †. Which of these Answers, would be made to my Question, I will not determine upon, though I think, without much Presumption, one might fix upon the latter.

IF it be agreed that to form a Militia upon the Plan of the Bill brought into Parliament in the last Session, would require at least four or five Years, or more, to render them useful to their Country, and as it is to be expected the War will not continue so long, how much would such

† This is upon the Supposition that immediately after passing the Bill, Commissions would have been issued for authorizing the Officers to raise the Militia, but if the Bill had passed in the Form it was rejected, his Majesty would not have been impower'd to issue those Commissions 'till after the 29th of *September*, 1756; so that if the Military Art could have been learnt in half an Hour, we should not have had a single Militia-Man yet in *England*.

such an Institution tend to our present Defence? can we afford an additional Expence of at least 175,137*l.* 10*s.* without any hope of drawing the least Advantage from it? What just Right would the Railers at public Measures have then to condemn the Prodigality and Wantonness in the Application of public Money. If a Militia would really be beneficial to this Kingdom, as a commercial State (which is a point I am not convinced of) would it not be better, at least, to defer it 'till after the present War, when we should be more able to spare the Expence attending the Raising and Disciplining them, and when they would make the greater Progress in the Use of Arms, by reason of the Number of Veteran Staff Officers, that would then be at leisure to teach them—an Advantage they could not reap in Time of War.

IF this Bill had passed into a Law in the last Session of Parliament, it would have been absolutely necessary to have brought in another in the next, or the succeeding Session, either to have corrected
the

the Errors of the former, or to have repealed it, as a great Number of Petitions would have been presented, particularly from the Dissenters, to complain of the Profanation of the Lord's Day, and others, in regard to more immediate Inconveniences which would have resulted from it. To prevent any kind of Imputation, which the passing of a Bill replete with Errors by the Parliament, might have cast upon them, the Lords judiciously judged it proper to give the Members of the House of Commons Time to confer with their Constituents, and by that means be informed of their various Sentiments upon the Bill, in order to discover the most effectual Means to put such a Law in Execution. When this Bill shall have undergone all the Improvements which the whole Nation can make to it, and which must certainly not only render it more agreeable to the People, but more easy to be put in Execution, it will be laid again before the Parliament ; what the Fate of it will then be, I cannot pretend to pronounce, but I doubt not if it shall appear a salutary Measure, it will pass.

THERE

THERE is a certain Precipitance in our Actions, that frequently renders the best Measures abortive—We hit upon Expedients when they should be executed, and would practise them the Instant we have thought on them, though they would require Years to mature—Like the Man that ordered an Engine to be made with all possible speed, because his House was on Fire,—but e'er the Frame was constructed, his House was burnt down ; he had better have employ'd himself assiduously in throwing Water with such Vessels as opportunely came to hand, which perhaps might have extinguished the Fire in time. If we had plan'd a Militia as soon as the last War was over, we might now have reaped what Advantage it would have produced ; but to form one now is only to furnish us with all its Disadvantages in the Aggregate. We had better take such Measures as will conduce to the End we aim—We can never expect to distress *France* in this War by a Militia that is not yet in it's Embrio, and which is not meant to stir out of the Island, but our Auxiliaries
may

may not only protect us here, but make any Diversions in our favour upon the Continent.

PERHAPS I have said more in regard to the Militia Bill, than many well-meaning Persons, in the Heat of their Disposition for it, will agree to.—They have been taught to believe, that with it they could reduce the naval Power of *France*, conquer her, and make her a Province of *England*.—They have been made to believe, that we have no Connections with the Continent, and that with a Militia and our Navy we might set all the Powers of *Europe* combined against us at nought.—They have not stopt here in their Credulity, many firmly believe that the M—ry is afraid to trust them with Arms, and that the *Hessians* and *Hanoverians* are brought over here to enslave them. But who are they that propagate such Reports?—Are they not Men who, with imaginary Talents, fancy they have a Claim to the sole Adm——n, and whose *turn-coat* Violence would set the whole Nation in a Blaze to make the M——ry odious, in order, not to serve
their

their Country—but replace them?—Men who are the Tools of such a wronghead Party, and fit for their Employ, acknowledge they write for a *Post* or the *Pillory*. In short, Men who either scribble for Bread, and do not so much regard the Contents as the Sale of their Productions.—Men who have done their utmost to be bought—but who have been found not worth the meanest Purchase.—And are ye, my Countrymen, to be idly duped by such as these?—Are you to do your utmost Endeavours to perplex the Adm——n, and take off their Attention from the Means of annoying your Enemies?—Are your Leaders to be giving you Reasons to calm your Apprehensions, when they should be thundering the Logic of their Cannon in your Enemies Ears?

BUT if the Militia Bill could, when no apparent Cause of ill Success heightened their Spleen, give Rise to such seditious Notions, what Joy must these violent Exclaimers against public Measures conceive, when they heard of the ill Behaviour of our Admiral.—When they even were in-

formed,

formed, from Authority, of the Loss of
Minorca !

IF after all the incoherent, yet virulent Attacks, that have been made upon the Administration on account of our ill Success in the *Mediterranean*, the Public can be so unprejudiced as to hear with Candour what just Grounds there were for these Calumnies, I submit the following Observations to them.

AT this Period, when every Dabbler in Politics thinks himself authorized to declaim against the M——ry, and fathom the deepest Arcanum of Cabinet Secrets, there is very little left for Statesmen and M——rs to direct; when the Reports artfully published in the foreign Gazettes by *French* Emissaries are pointed out to us to be the Rule of our Action, and the best Intelligence, supported by Reason and prefatory Measures, are to be disregarded as Feints, though conducted against the principal Object that could be attacked; it is not to be wondered at, that just Measures should be condemned, and those com-
mended,

mended, which, if pursued, must have inevitably ended in our Destruction. In fine, if we had, in consequence of the repeated Advices furnished by the *Paris* and other Gazetteers, been lured to have sent all the Men of War upon our Coasts, and elsewhere nearly stationed, as also the greatest Part of the Troops in this Island, for the Defence of *Gibraltar*, which they told us (about *January* last) was in imminent Danger, whilst the Number of *French* Troops upon the Coasts of *Languedoc* and *Provence* did not amount to *Ten Thousand*, and those upon the Coasts of *Normandy*, *Picardy*, and *French Flanders*, were not fewer in Number than 150,000; when the *Flat-bottom Boats*, from *Dunkirk* to *St. Malo*, were without Number; when there were no less than Forty Sail of Men of War at *Brest* and *Rochefort*, and when the greatest Part of *De la Gallissoniere's* Squadron was still upon the Stocks at *Toulon*; to imagine we should not have had a powerful Invasion in this Kingdom, at a Time when we had not more than 18,000 Troops in *Great-Britain* (and which must have been proportionably diminished by the sending

of Succours to *Gibraltar*) as yet unassisted by our Auxiliaries ; one must just judge from an *inverted Plan* of the whole *French* Conduct for this last half Century.

IF Part of the Fleet which was stationed in the Year 1745 in the *Mediterranean* had been properly distributed upon our Coasts, and the Army under his Royal Highness the Duke, then in *Flanders*, been kept here for the Security of this Island, all the Calamities of the last Rebellion, which (to prevent my Reader much retrospective Affliction) I shall pass over, would have been avoided. After such a fatal Experience, when greater Destruction still threatened, to have bereft this Land of a proper Defence, would indeed have been an unpardonable Error in the M——rs.

THEN to condemn the Conduct of the M——ry for continuing a sufficient Number of Troops in this Island for its Safety, and not detaching a powerful Squadron from the Coasts, which must have been left then unguarded ; even when the public
lic

lic Papers refounded the pretended Project of the *French* upon *Minorca*; is only preferring the Risk of all *Great-Britain* to that of *Minorca*—and no *Englishman*, sure, however infatuated, can pretend to say, he would wish *Great-Britain* possessed by the *French*, in lieu of that Island. When we consider the Situation *Minorca* was in (even the Beginning of *April* last) the little Probability there was for the *French* to hope for Success, from its (almost) impregnable Fortifications; the *Insignificance* it must ever be of to them, who must certainly spend more in the Support of a Garrison there, than the Result of any Advantages they can derive from it; the Continuance of that vast Number Troops upon their Coasts of the *Ocean* and the *Channel*; who could doubt that a Nation, who has ever been famous for keeping their *real Designs* secret, would publish them in the Gazettes of all *Europe*, or that what they thus notified was not to put us upon a strong Scent. Such, certainly, were their Intentions; and if we had sent a sufficient Number of Men of War to the *Mediterranean* to have left

left our Coasts unguarded, as well as our Island, by considerable Draughts of Troops, we should have had a second Representation of that real Tragedy that every *Englishman* was Spectator of in the Years 1745 and 1746; and this is corroborated by several authentic Accounts of the *young Chevalier* being actually at *Dunkirk* in *February* last, as several *English* Gentlemen, whose Veracity may be relied upon, were Witnesses, and knew him, although disguised. But the *French* finding we would not give into their Lure, played an *After-game*, unthought of till they found their *Feint* would not succeed. As soon as we had certain Advices of their real Design, we were not behind hand in taking such Measures as the Exigence of the Case required; and if our Fleet did not sail till the Beginning of *April*, it was not to be attributed to any Backwardness in the Orders from the Admiralty;—they were repeated and reiterated for the speedy Equipment of these Ships;—and, indeed, the Fleet was ready some Weeks before they sailed, but they were not compleatly man'd till the very Day of their Departure from

from *Spithead*, and then the only Expedient that could be found for manning them was the turning over all the Crews of the other Ships in that Port on board them, —which is a sufficient Answer to all Questions, “ Why did not we send a superior Fleet under Mr. *Byng* ?” as there were then but three Men of War in *Plymouth* Sound, and two of them were returned from Sir *Edward Hawke*’s Fleet in the Bay of *Biscay**, on account of the Sickness of their Crews ;—the other was the Guard-Ship at *Plymouth*.

BUT I believe no body has doubted, that if Mr. *B—g* had made all the Sail he could to *Gibraltar*, and tarried there no longer than was needful ; or behaved well

* I suppose none of the most inveterate ministerial Critics would pretend saying, we should have sent Admiral *Hawke*’s Fleet to the *Mediterranean* any more than the Cruizers in the Channel ; since the first of these Measures must inevitably have produced the Release of the *Brest* Squadron, and the other given the *French* all the Advantages they could desire for a Descent here.

well in the Action of the 20th of *May*, that the *French* would have gained any Victory over us in the *Mediterranean*; either by Land or-Sea.

As to any invidious Insinuations that Mr. *B—g* had not Orders to Fight or Land the Troops, that were on board his Fleet at *Minorca*; it will be only necessary to cite, *verbatim*, Lord *Anson's* Letter to Mr. *Byng*, concerning the Disposition of Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment, which was produced at General *Fowke's* Trial; *viz.*

“ S I R,

“ I T being His Majesty's Pleasure, that
 “ Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment do
 “ serve on board your Fleet, to do duty
 “ there; and. His Majesty having issued
 “ Orders by the Secretary at War to
 “ General *Fowke*, to make a Detachment
 “ equal to a Battalion, from his Garrison,
 “ for the Relief of *Minorca*; you are to
 “ conform yourself to the said Orders,
 “ and to carry that Detachment on board
 “ your Fleet, and land them at *Minorca*.
 “ And

" And in case, upon Conference had with
 " General *Blakeney*, he shall think it ne-
 " cessary, you shall then land Lord Ro-
 " bert Bertie's Regiment also at *Makon*,
 " from on board your Fleet.

" Sign'd ANSON.

AFTER this, I am positive, no Man
 that feels for his native Land, and has not
 some sinister View in raising Commotions
 in the State, can suppose that Lord *A—n's*
 Orders, or any from the Ad——ty in-
 structed Mr. *B——g* to behave like a Co-
 ward or a Villain. I wish I were autho-
 rized to publish here this Adm—l's In-
 structions at Large, which I am sure (if
 you are a Lover of your Country) would
 give you all that Satisfaction, which must
 be conceived in being convinced that *no-*
body at Home, was privy to any Dastardly
 Actions in the *Mediterranean*; but as I am
 not, take this Letter as a Sample, and be
 not so ungrateful to a Man, who did his
 Country such real Service in the last War,
 as not to have as much Confidence in
 him as you would in the most common
 G Trader,

2
 Trader, whose Goods you purchase upon a Specimen ; at least suspend your Judgment till Mr. *Byng's* Tryal, which cannot now be far off, when, as your Gracious Sovereign has told You, “ He will not
 “ fail to do Justice upon any Persons who
 “ shall have been wanting in their Duty
 “ to him and their Country.”

If *Ireland* acquired much *Glory* by their *Noble Stand* in 1753 and 1754, against every Thing that wore the Aspect of Oppression ; if to that may be subjoined, the *Additional-feeling* every *Hibernian* must have for the Loss of *Minorca*, proportionable to the hard Fate of his Countryman the Great *Blakeney* ; surely their Conduct upon the present Occasion may be admitted in some Shape as a Precedent, and yet we find in their *Loyal Associations* they resolve, “ * That at this *Juncture* it is necessary to *suspend* all Complaints of Ministerial Measures, however grievous
 “ and oppressive ; being fully convinced
 “ that his Majesty's inherent Justice will
 “ induce

* See the Associations of the City of *Dublin*, County of *Meath*, &c.

“ induce him to maintain the Constitu-
 “ tional Rights and Liberties of the Sub-
 “ ject; those grand Incitements of *Eng-*
 “ *lishmen*, to risque their Lives and For-
 “ tunes.”

IT is plain that nobody will be screen'd,
 be they of what *Rank* soever; for though
 General *F——ke's* Conduct would admit
 of some palliation, his Letter to Lord
Barrington, having proved he understood
 the Orders sent him, and that he debated
 in the Council of War concerning the
 Efficacy of the Measures; he was judged
 an improper Person to serve any more in
 his Majesty's Army.

JUDGE by this what Reason we have
 to apprehend Justice will not be impartially
 executed. Therefore it is needless to tor-
 ment the Sovereign with Complaints that
 either have no Foundation, or else he is
 apprised of. If we have so much Leisure
 as to pretend being beneficial to our Coun-
 try, let us be really so: Let us assiduously
 employ ourselves, not in railing at the
 Adm——n before we know they are

culpable, but in discovering the most probable Means of recovering our Losses. *Minorca* has been taken, it may be retaken—Our Fleet is so superior to the *French* in the *Mediterranean*, our Commanders so much to be relied upon, and our Ships so situated, that a good Project executed, in time, by an able Commander, would carry it.

E R R A T A.

Title Page, for *Inviduous* r. *Invidious*; *ibid*, for *Vertute* r. *Virtute*. Page 4, l. 22, in *Conferences* dele the 2d r. Page 5, l. 4, in *Conferences* dele the 2d r. *ibid*, l. 16, for *could* r. *would*. *ibid*, l. 17, after *not having* add *our*. Page 13, l. 19, in *Seneca's* dele the *Apostrophe*. Page 16, l. 23, after *Auxiliaries* dele the (.) and r. a (,) Page 30, l. 11, for *Prussian* r. *Russian*. Page 35, l. 3, in *Objections* dele the s.

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